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prescribe the qualifications required for

U

to practice
at the bar
regarded
NDER
the common
lawis the
right
more in the nature of a privilege
than a general right. This is shown by
the fact that the lawyer first has to be
"'called" or "admitted" before he will be
permitted to engage in the practice. The
admission of lawyers to the practice was,
by the common law, generally regarded
as a judicial function, which, of course,
could be exercised by the courts only.
Even in our day many courts have expressed doubts whether, in the absence
of constitutional provisions, the legislature has the power to prescribe the conditions upon which applicants may be
admitted to the bar, while others have
denied that power to the legislature altogether. Perhaps in most of the states
the subject is now considered to be within the legislative control, as a part of
the police power, the same as in the case
of other professions; and it is accordingly held that the lawmaking power may

candidates for the bar as a prerequisite
for admission, at least when the same do
not conflict with the other requirements
prescribed by the courts. During and
immediately after the Civil War, Congress and several of the state legislatures
prescribed, as one of the tests of the
qualification of an attorney to practice
law, an oath to the effect that the applicant had not given aid or support to
the rebellion against the government.
These statutory enactments were declared void by the Supreme Court of the
United States and some of the state
tribunals, as being ex post facto in their
nature, and also as being a violation of
the provisions of the general pardon declared by the President of the United
States in favor of all offenders that had
taken part on the Confederate side in
the War of the Rebellion. In some of
the states, however, the courts upheld
the power of the legislature to make

* By permission of The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, Ind.

16

(211)

The American Law School Review.

212

such laws. With the ex post facto and
pardon features eliminated, their constitutionality is generally considered as being a proper exercise of the police power
of the state and of the nation.
Under the New York Constitution of
1846, any male citizen of the age of
twenty-one years, of good moral character, who possessed the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, was entitled to admission to practice in all the
courts of the state. While this provision
was in force the legislature enacted a
statute declaring that the diploma. of the
law school of Columbia College should
be conclusive evidence "of the learning
and ability of its possessor. This statute was declared unconstitutional by the
supreme court of the state, upon the
theory that the power to pass upon the
qualifications of attorneys to practice law
was judicial in its nature, and could not
be taken away from the courts by legislation. But the court of appeals, in the
case of Henry W. Cooper (22 N. Y. 67),
reversed the decision of the supreme
court, saying: "The legislature has not
taken from the court its jurisdiction over
the question of admission, but has simply
prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon the question.
It is not necessary, as seems to have been
supposed by the court below, that the
power to do this should be especially
granted by the Constitution. The gen-.
eral grant of power in paragraph 1, article 3, embraces the entire legislative power of the state, which in itself is absolute
and unlimited. Whether, therefore, the
Constitution contains a restriction upon
this power in the particular case is the
only question which can ever arise in respect to an exercise of power by the legislature.

*

*

*

It will not be doubt-

ed, even assuming that the court had exclusive power of admission, that the legislature might have provided that the

affidavit of the applicant should be evidence upon the question of age, or the
certificate of some public officer upon
that of citizenship. There is no substantial difference, in respect to the power of
the legislature, between such cases and
that under consideration. The diploma
simply proves that the applicant has the
requisite learning and ability, but leaves
the facts in regard to the length of study,
the age, citizenship, etc., of the applicant
to be inquired into and passed upon by
the court, in determining the question of
admission." If, therefore, the applicant
for admission possessed the other qualifications required by the Constitution, to
wit, age and citizenship, a diploma from
the law school of Columbia College was
sufficient to entitle him to admission, and
with this construction the constitutionality of the New York statute was upheld.
In Indiana the Constitution provides
that every person of good moral character, being a voter, shall be entitled to admission to practice law in all the courts:
of justice. This provision is identical
with the provision in the New York Constitution referred to, except that it does
not contain a clause requiring any "qualifications of learning and ability." The
provision in the state Constitution has
generally been interpreted to mean that
no other qualifications than those of good
moral character and the right to vote are
necessary in order to be entitled to admission to the practice of law in all courts
of justice.
In 1849 the legislature of Wisconsin
passed an act containing substantially
the same provision as that contained in
the Constitution of Indiana with respect
to the qualifications of applicants for admission to the bar. The act, however,
was not generally enforced, but the supreme court of that state nevertheless
took occasion to express its views upon
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the propriety, if not the validity, of such
an act, in the following strong language:
"We do not understand that the circuit
courts generally yield to the unwise and
unseemly act of 1849, which assumes to
force upon the courts, as attorneys, any
person of good moral character, however unlearned or even illiterate; however disqualified by nature, education,
or habits for the important trusts of the
profession. We learn from the clerk
of this court that no application under
the statute was ever made here. The
good sense of the legislature has long
since led to its repeal. And we have too
much reliance on the judgment of the
legislature to apprehend another such
attempt to degrade the courts. The state
suffers substantially by every such assault of one branch of the government
upon another, and it is the duty of all
the co-ordinate branches scrupulously
to avoid even all seeming of such. If,
unfortunately, such an attack on the dignity of the courts should again be made,
it will be time for the courts to inquire
whether the rule of admission be within
the legislative or the judicial powers.
But we will not anticipate such an unwise
and unbecoming interference in what so
peculiarly concerns the courts, whether
the power to make it exists or not. In
the meantime it is a pleasure to defer
to all reasonable statutes on the subject."
(Matter of Goodell, 39 Wis. 232.)
It cannot be denied that the general
standard of qualification for admission
to the bar in our country has taken an
upward tendency. In perhaps all the
states and territories except the state of
Indiana applicants for admission to the
bar are required to undergo some kind
of an examination, either before the
court in session, or a committee of attorneys appointed by the court, or a
state board of examiners. These requirements are prescribed, in most cases,

by statutory enactments; thus showing
the growth of popular sentiment in favor
of preliminary preparation, and in some
instances by rules of court. Statutes of
this character have generally been held
constitutional, but in Florida an act
passed in 1897 entitled "An act to regulate admission to the bar of this state, to
create a board of legal examiners, and to
provide for a uniform system of legal
examinations," was held unconstitutional,
because it created state officers on the
board of legal examiners, and failed to
provide for their election by the people
or appointment by the governor, as required by the Constitution, but made
such officers appointive by the supreme
court, and fixed their terms of office for
a period longer than the constitutional
limit. (State v. Hocker, 39 Fla. 477.)
In a recent Illinois cage the supreme
court of that state asserts in positive
terms the inherent power of the courts
to pass upon the question of admissibility
to the bar, untrammeled by legislative
interference, and denounces the attempt
of the legislature to override the rules
of the supreme court, respecting such
admission, as an unconstitutional assumption of judicial power. (In re Day, 181
Ill. 73.) "The right to practice law,"
said the court, "is a privilege, and a
license for that purpose makes the holder
an officer of the court, and confers upon
him the right to appear for litigants, to
argue causes, and to collect fees therefor,
and creates certain exemptions, such as
from jury service and arrest on civil process

while

attending

court.

*

*

*

Another fatal objection to the provision
in question is that the legislature in its
enactment overlooked the restraint imposed by the constitution, and assumed
the exercise of power belonging to the
courts. A provision which has been incorporated in each successive constitution
of this state is found in the present con-
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stitution as article 3, in the following
language: 'The powers of the government of this state are divided into three
distinct departments-legislative, executive, and judicial; and no person or
collection of persons, being one of these
departments, shall exercise any power
properly belonging to either of the others, except as hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.' " From this provision in the organic law of its state the
court proceeds to discuss the relative
powers of legislatures. and courts upon
the subject under consideration, reviewing the history of English parliamentary
legislation with reference to it, and concluding that, even if parliament could
have exercised such powers, the state legislature cannot do so, owing to the prescribed constitutional limitations. After
noticing the decisions of different courts
in this country respecting the subject,
and deploring the legislative enactments
and constitutional provisions of some
jurisdictions which declare that male citizens of good moral character shall be
entitled to practice law, the court proceeds to say: "This court has never acknowledged the power of the legislature
to prescribe the amount of learning which
shall qualify an attorney to practice in our
courts. * * * The effect of enforcing such a statute would be to degrade
the profession and fill the ranks with
those not qualified by our rules. * * *
In any consideration of the question it
must not be forgotten that* restrictions
upon the privilege of practicing law are
created only in the interest of the public
welfare, and neither for nor against the
student. * * * The legislature may
enact police legislation for the protection
of the public against things hurtful or
threatening to their safety and welfare.
So long as they do not infringe upon the
powers properly belonging to the court,
they may prescribe reasonable conditions

which will exclude from the practice
those persons through whom injurious
consequences are likely to result to the
inhabitants of the state. * * * It
will be strange, indeed, if the court can
control its own courtroom, and even its
own janitor, but that it is not within its
power to inquire into the ability of the
persons who assist in the administration
of justice as its officers. * * * The
function of determining whether one
who seeks to become an officer of the
courts, and conduct cases therein, is sufficiently acquainted with the rules established by the legislature and the court
governing the right of parties, and under
which justice is administered, pertains to
the courts themselves. They must decide whether he has sufficient legal learning to enable him to apply those rules to
varying conditions of facts, and to bring
the facts and law before the courts, so
that a correct conclusion may be reached.
* * * The fact that the legislature
may prescribe the qualifications of doctors, plumbers, horseshoers, and persons
following other professions or callings
not connected with the judicial system,
and may say what shall be evidence of
such qualifications, can have no influence
upon this question. * * * The attorney is a necessary part of the judicial
system, and his vocation is not merely
to find persons who are willing to have
lawsuits. He is the first one to sit in
judgment on every case, and whether
the court shall be called upon to act depends upon his decision."
This is taking a very exalted view of the position
of an attorney, but it is no more so than
is merited by his relation to the court as
one of its officers. It will be noticed that
the court does not deny the power and
propriety of the legislative branch to
place restrictions upon the right to practice law, by prescribing certain qualifications, etc., but it does deny the right of
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the lawmaking power to say what restrictions shall not be placed upon such
right by the courts. The Indiana constitution not only strips the courts of the
inherent power to pass upon the qualification of candidates for the bar, but
even denies to the legislature the power
of prescribing the terms of eligibility or
of conferring such right upon the courts.
This is a reversal of the usual order of
things, and places a premium upon ignorance instead of upon intelligence and
learning. It says to the legislator as well
as to the judge: "You shall never deny
to any person the privilege of practicing
law simply because that person does not
know any law. You may say to the
physician that he shall not treat a case
of colic, or to the dentist that he may not
prescribe for a toothache, or to the veterinary that he shall not undertake to
doctor a horse, without having first submitted to a test of professional knowledge
and skill; but you shall never say to the
person who desires to become a member
of one of the most responsible of all professions, and to whom are to be confided
some of the most sacred of trusts-involving the lives, the liberties, and the honor
of those who seek his counsel and enlist
his services, to him who is to become an
integral part of the court itself, as one
of its officers, and who is to assist it in
upholding the majesty of the law-you
shall never say to him that he, too, must
give some evidence of his knowledge of
dind fitness to deal with the things which
are to be entrusted to him before he shall
receive the approval of the state to take
upon himself such responsible duties."
It cannot be truthfully asserted, therefore, that in Indiana the power of deciding who shall be admitted to the bar is
either a judicial or a legislative power,
inasmuch as the constitution itself prescribes who shall enjoy that privilege.
Every person of good moral character,
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who is a voter, has the right to practice
law. It would seem to follow from this,
under the maxim, "The express mentiori
of one thing impliedly excludes all others," that no one but persons of good
moral character who are legal voters
should have the right to practice law in
the courts of Indiana, and hence that a
person who is not a legal voter could not
be admitted. But the supreme court has
ruled otherwise. In the case of In re
Leach it is held that the constitutional
provision is not a limitation upon the
right to membership, but that it simply
secures the right to practice to such persons as are legal voters, etc. In other
words, legal voters of good moral character are made secure in the right of admission, while those who are not legal
voters are not necessarily excluded. As
there are no rules prescribed by law for
the admission of women, eo. nomine, the
decision further declares that "the power
exists as one of the inherent privileges
of the court, and as necessarily incident
to its control over the membership of its
bar," to admit women upon such rules as
to character and learning as may be
deemed proper.
It is gratifying to note that, in jurisdictions where the question is regarded as
a legislative one, most of the state legislatures have proved adequate to the situation, and have prescribed tests which cannot fail to elevate the standard of the
profession. In many states, besides the
general legal qualifications required, candidates for the bar are required also to
pass a preliminary examination concerning their general educational qualifications, in which they must give satisfactory evidence that they have received
what is at least equivalent to a good high
school education. In some states it is
provided that a diploma from some particular law school or from any law
school in good standing in the state shall
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admit the applicant, without examination,
although on account of the existence of
the great number of "diploma mills,"
and the unfairness implied in granting
the privilege to some particular school,
such a measure is regarded as of doubtful propriety. In all jurisdictions candidates for the bar are required to produce
satisfactory evidence of their good moral
character. This has relation only to
the character of the applicant for honesty
and integrity, such as may be necessary
for a lawyer in good standing in his
profession. In most all the states statutes exist requiring that a person, to be
eligible to be admitted to the bar, must
be at least twenty-one years old. The
following states are exceptions to this
r'ule: In Delaware the applicant need
be but eighteen years old; in Georgia
the age is not mentioned, and is therefore immaterial; in Kansas he need be
only a citizen of the United States; in
Maryland not even citizenship is required, and nothing is mentioned as to
age. A statute of Arkansas providing
that the circuit court may remove the
disabilities of infants, so as to enable them
to do business as adults, is held by the
supreme court of that state not to abrogate the provision of the prior statute
requiring applicants for admission to the
bar to be twenty-one years of age. But
under a similar statute in Florida the
court holds that a minor has a right to be
admitted, if qualified, and that he may
enforce such right by mandamus.
Under the common law, it has been
generally held that a woman has no right,
even if properly qualified as to character
and learning, to demand admission to the
bar; and hence, in the absence of statutory or constitutional provisions giving
her that privilege, she has generally been
regarded as ineligible. In Bradwell's
Case, 55 Ill. 535, affirmed in 16 Wall.
(U. S.) 130, the supreme court of Illinois

decided that under the laws of that state
no authority then existed for the admission of women to the practice of law.
In Wisconsin the supreme court denied
the right of women to admission to practice, and refused to exercise the discretion to admit them, on the ground that it
would be contrary to public policy. (In
re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232.) And in Lockwood's Case (9 Ct. of Cl. 346, affirmed in
154 U. S. 116) the United States court of
claims reached, the same conclusion as
did the courts in Illinois and Wisconsin,
giving among other reasons why women
should not be admitted to the practice the
following: "In cases of misconduct by
an attorney, he may be attached by the
court and imprisoned; but if the attorney were a married woman, she might
come in and say that the misconduct occurred in her husband's presence, and
that, at common law, it was by his compulsion. She might misapply the funds
of a client, or be guilty of gross neglect
or fraud, and the husband be sued at
common law for the wrong." And so
the general term of the supreme court of
New York ruled that, under the laws of
that state then existing, a woman was not
entitled to admission to the bar. (In re
Stoneman, reported in note "a" to 53
Am. Rep. 323.) It has also been repeatedly decided that the denial to a woman
of the privilege of practicing law is not
a violation of the provision of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of
the United States.
In many states of the Union, statutes
are now in force enabling women to practice law, while in others the courts hold
that no statute or constitutional provision is necessary to entitle women to
the exercise of the right. Since the decision of the Robinson Case (131 Mass.
376), in which the supreme court of
Massachusetts denied the right of women in that state to be admitted to the
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bar, the legislature of the commonwealth has passed a law providing that
women shall have the same right to be
admitted to the practice as men. And
since the decision of the Stoneman Case,
the legislature of New York amended
the Code so that race or sex is no longer
sufficient ground for excluding from admission to the bar. And since the decision of the Bradwell Case (55 Ill. 535)
the statutes of Illinois have been so
changed that no person can be precluded
or debarred from any occupation, profession or employment, except military,
on account of sex. In Indiana there is no
statute giving to women the right to
practice law, but as we have seen, the
supreme court in the Case of Leach (134
Ind. 665) decided that the courts possess
the inherent power to admit them without such a statute. "Whatever the objections of the common law of England," said Judge Hackney, who delivered the opinion of the court, "there is
a law higher in this country, and better
suited to the rights and liberties of the
American people-that law which accords to every citizen the natural right
to gain a livelihood by intelligence, honesty, and industry in the arts, the sciences, the professions, or other vocations.
This right may not, of course, be pursued in violation of law. We are not
unmindful that other states, notably Illinois, Wisconsin, Oregon, Maryland,
and Massachusetts, have held that, in
the absence of an express grant of the
privilege, it may not be conferred upon
women. In some instances the holding
has been upon constitutional provisions
unlike that of this state, and in others
upon what we are constrained to believe
an erroneous recognition of a supposed
common-law inhibition. However, each
of the states named made haste to create by legislation the right which it was
supposed was forbidden by the common
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law, and thereby recognized the progress
of American women beyond the narrow
limits prescribed in' Westminster Hall."
The supreme court of Colorado took
the same advanced ground as the Indiana court, deciding that women are
eligible to be admitted to the bar without
any enabling statutes. (In re Thomas,
16 Colo. 441.) And the court in that
case observes that attorneys are not civil
officers, within the meaning of the provision of the Colorado Constitution that
no person except a qualified elector shall
be eligible to any civil or military office,
and declares that there is nothing in the
common law or the statutes of that state
which prevents women from being admitted to practice in the courts. Speaking of the decisions of other states upon
the subject, the court said: "The written opinions mentioned marshal all objections to conferring this privilege upon women, dwelling with especial force
and clearness upon those existing outside of constitutional and statutory provisions. They ably discuss questions of
impropriety and expediency based upon
the laws of nature, the bearing of historical customs and usages, and the impediment growing out of women's legal
status at the common law. With all
deference to those learned courts, we decline to imitate their example in the
latter regard. We shall not indulge in
speculation concerning the natural aptitude and physical ability of women to
perform the duties of the profession,
nor shall we dwell upon considerations
of propriety or expediency in the premises. These are matters as to which
wide differences of opinion exist; and
we concede that they have little, if any,
bearing upon similar applications now
presented in this state, however pertinent they may have been in the commonwealths referred to when the above rulings were made. We shall likewise de-
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cline to give controlling weight to historic custom or usage in England, in the
American colonies, and in the republic
during its infancy. Reasoning predicated upon the latter ground possesses
the inherent weakness of ignoring to a
greater or less extent the marvelous
changes throughout the country during
the last fifty years in the legal status of
women. It is a significant circumstance,
indicating the trend of popular sentiment on the subject, that each of the
cases above referred to was speedily folloWed by a statute. providing for the admission of women to the profession.
The supreme court of the United States
and the courts of the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Illinois, and Wisconsin no longer adhere to the rule of discrimination on the ground of sex. Women are now licensed without question
to practice in these courts, as well as in
those of several other, states, upon the
same conditions as men, save only that
the act of congress requires three years'
membership to the bar of the highest
court in some territory as a condition
precedent to their appearance before the
supreme court of the United States.
* * * Hence we contend with none
of the difficulty encountered by the courts
above mentioned, arising from the disabilities of women-especially married
women-at the common law. Applications like the one before us may therefore be regarded with the judicial favor
usually extended when equality of rights
is involved, unless some restrictive provision be found in our statutes or Constitution." The court finds none of these
restrictive provisions, and concludes by
saying: "We have no disposition to
postpone falling into line with the supreme court of the United States and
other enlightened tribunals throughout
the country, that have finally, voluntarily, or in obedience to statutory injunc-

tion, disregarded the criterion of sex, and
opened the door of the profession to
women as well as men."
It has been a custom of long standing in this country to permit lawyers in
good repute in other states to practice in
particular cases without examinaLion or

being sworn as practicing attorneys of
the state into whose courts they seek to
be admitted. But an attorney has no
right to compel such admission, if refused; it being a mere matter of custom
and comity, and confined to the trial of
certain causes in which the attorney is
retained for the time being. It does not
include the right to a general license to
practice. In some of the states it is provided by statute that attorneys from 'other states may be admitted to full membership of the bar if they have been practicing before the highest court of their
own state for a given number of years.
Under the decisions of the supreme
court of California, a Chinaman will not
be admitted to membership in that state,
although he presents a license to practice
in the highest court of another state, and
exhibits naturalization papers issued
from a court of a sister state; such papers being held void under the act of
congress of May 18, 1882. (In re Hong
Yen Chang, 84 Cal. 163.) And in Maryland, under the act of the legislature of
that state passed in 1876, it was held that
a colored citizen of the state is not eligible to admission to the bar. (In re Taylor, 48 Md. 28.) In North Carolina unnaturalized aliens cannot be licensed to
practice law. (In re Thompson, 10 N.
C. 355.) But in Ohio a foreigner who
resides in the state, and has declared his
intention of becoming a citizen of the
United States, and possesses the other
necessary qualifications, may be admitted. (Ex parte Porter, 3 Ohio Dec. 333.)
In New York it has been said that there
is no natural right in favor of any one
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not i citizen of the state or of the United
States to be admitted to practice at the
bar, and some statute or constitutional
provision is regarded as necessary to entitle such person to admission. (Matter
of O'Neill, 90 N. Y. 584.) In some
states resident aliens are expressly given the privilege of such admission by
act of the legislature. In England, before a person can becomt an attorney, he
must, besides taking the prescribed examination, become an articled clerkthat is to say, he must have entered into
articles with some practicing attorney
or solicitor, binding himself to serve him
for five years as clerk in his office, and
must have served as such during the
whole time articled. If the candidate
has the degree of A. B. or LL. B. from
some one of the designated universities,
he may be admitted after three years'
service instead of five. It is provided by
statute in some of the American states,
as in New Jersey, for instance, that every
applicant for admission to the bar must
have served as clerk in some lawyer's
office for a prescribed period, next before
his examination for admission. Where
this is the rule, it is held that the candidate must show by satisfactory evidence
that he has actually served as such clerk
during the required period, and that he
was actively engaged during such time
in assisting the attorney whom he served
as clerk, with the business under his
control. (Matter of Dunn, 43 N. J. L.
359.) It is not enough that he should
simply have read law under the direction
or tutorship of such attorney. "A clerkship to an attorney," said the supreme
court of New Jersey in the case cited,
"imports the office of assistant to an attorney-an actual occupation in and
about the attorney's business and under
his control. The service is to be rendered not solely or mainly by the study
of lawbooks, but chiefly by attending to

219

the work of the attorney under his direction. The purpose of the rule is that
the clerk shall be actually engaged in the
practice of law under the guidance of his
master for the stated period, so that by
direct contact with an attorney's duties
he may acquire the skill and facility in
the profession which are necessary for
enabling him to protect and promote independently the interests that clients may
afterwards commit to him. This is the
sole object of requiring the clerkship to
be served with a practicing attorney.
For the mere study of legal principles, a
retired counselor or a professor would
be an apter guide." The pursuit of
classical studies was deemed sufficient
in importance in the state of New York,
where a clerkship was also required to
be served, to warrant the enactment of a
law providing for the diminution of the
term of the clerkship, upon proof of the
applicant's having, to a certain extent,
and for a certain period, pursued the
studies of the classics.
Under the common law, as we have
seen, the courts determined for themselves who should be admitted to practice at their bar, but this did not give
them the arbitrary power of rejecting
any one who possessed the qualifications
prescribed by the rules of the court.
Hence the appellate courts were not
without power to command the admission of candidates to the lower tribunals,
if they were arbitrarily rejected by them
without cause. It came to be regarded
as the law, therefore, that, if an applicant was improperly rejected or suspended or disbarred by the lower court, the
writ of mandate would issue to restore
him to his rights; but, when he had been
properly rejected or disbarred, the writ
would not lie. (Walls v. Farmer, 64
Ind. 493.)
Upon admission to the bar of Indiana,
it is provided by statute that an attorney
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shall take an oath that he will support
the Constitution of the United States and
of the state of Indiana, and that he will
faithfully and honestly discharge his
duty as an attorney at law. An official
oath of some nature is required in every
state. There is no substantial difference
in the contents of the oath in the different
states. In Pennsylvania the applicant
swears or affirms that he will support
the Constitution of the United States and
of the commonwealth, and that he will
behave himself in the office of attorney
within the court with all good fidelity,, as
well to the court as to the client, and that
he will use no falsehood, nor delay any
person's cause for lucre or malice. The
oath or affirmation required to be taken
by an attorney or counselor on his admission to the bar of the supreme court
of the United States is as follows: "I
do solemnly swear, or affirm, that I will
demean myself as an attorney and counselor of this court, uprightly and according to law; and that I will support the
Constitution of the United States."
(Rule 2, Supreme Court.) In some of the
states, the oath of an attorney is that he
will not violate the duties enjoined upon
him by law.
In most of the states an attorney at law
is required to procure a license or certificate before he is permitted to enter
upon the practice of his profession. The
mere fact that a statute substitutes a
diploma from a law school for an examination at the bar will not excuse the
holder of such diploma from procuring
a license. But where the license is issued by the supreme court, it has been
held that an admission to the bar of that
court, which has been made a matter of
record, is equivalent to the required license. (Ii! re Villere, 33 La. Ann. 998.)
A license from the supreme court of
New York, stating that the holder has

been admitted to the bar of the court of

appeals of New York, is held not to be
a compliance with the rule of court in
Pennsylvania, which allows an attorney
practicing in the highest court of a state
to practice before the supreme court of
Pennsylvania; as the supreme court of
New York has no authority to certify to
the admission of attorneys to practice before the court of appeals. (In re Splane,
123 Pa. St. 527.)
The right to practice law includes not
only the right of admission to the bar,
but the further right of continuing in
the practice after such admission. What
was originally a privilege has now become a vested right, which can only be
taken away by due process of law. By
his admission the attorney becomes an
officer of the court, amenable to its rules
and regulations, and, to a large extent,
subject to its control. By violating the
rules of court, or committing any act
which renders the attorney unfit to remain in such office, he may forfeit his
right to continue therein. It is generally
conceded that, as incident to the power
of admitting attorneys to the bar, the
courts have also the power to suspend or
disbar them from practice for their misconduct. As the occasions for disbarment are far more rare than those for admission, it happens that the great contrariety of opinion as to the methods and
consequences which we find in regard to,
admissions does not exist in case of disbarments.
The inherent power of courts to disbar an attorney may be restricted by
statute, and such power may be vested
in a particular court or courts, when the
tribunal from which the power is taken
is one of limited or special jurisdiction.
In North Carolina it is declared by statute that no attorney shall be disbarred
except upon a conviction for a criminal
offense or after a confession in open
court, and the provision has been held
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valid and constitutional. (Ex parte
Schenck, 65 N. C. 353.) And in North
Dakota it has been decided that, where
specific causes are prescribed for which
an attorney may be disbarred, he cannot
be disbarred for any other. (In re Eaton, 7 N. D. 269.) But the general rule
and weight of authority are to the effect
that statutes prescribing causes for disbarment are not regarded as limiting the
common-law power of the court to disbar for causes not mentioned in the statute. (In re Mills, 1 Mich. 392; Delano's
Case, 58 N. H. 5.)
A court will not be justified summarily
to strike an attorney's name from the
rolls without the proceedings prescribed
by statute, if such there .be, or some procedure constituting process of law under
the common law. A contempt of court
may be such as to warrant disbarment,
but here, too, there must be a charge and
a hearing, before there can be a valid
judgment revoking the attorney's license.
(State v. Root, 5 N. D. 487.) In the federal courts it is held that an attorney
may be disbarred for any act showing
him to be unfit to practice in the courts,
as one of the officers thereof, such as
shows a bad moral character, or the commission of criminal, vicious, or other acts
inconsistent with his official relation to
the court, as when he engages in a riot,
or aids a mob to lynch a prisoner. (In
re Wall, 13 Fed. Rep. 814.) One of the
acts which has been made sufficient
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ground for the disbarment of an attorney in Colorado and other states is that
of advertising for divorce cases-notably
the repeated insertions of such announcements as "Divorces legally obtained very
quietly; good everywhere." (People v.
McCabe, 18 Colo. 186. See, also, People
v. Goodrich, 79 Ill. 148.) Disbarments
have been held justifiable on the grounds
of libel; instituting divorce proceedings
on behalf of the wife at the instance of
the husband, but without her authority;
offering to sell information to the adverse party; subornation of perjury; obtaining illegal fees in pension cases; falsifying records or documents; abstracting
records from the court files; filing false
affidavit for change of venue, bribing a
witness, and threatening to chastise the
judge of the court, though done outside
of court.
As in the case of admission to the bar,
so as to the right to continue in the practice, the tendency appears to be toward
a higher standard. Recent convictions
of jury bribers and disbarments of recreant. attorneys are encouraging signs for
the future. The American Bar Association is doing a great work in advancing
the standard of the profession generally.
What the American Bar Association is
doing in the country at large, local bar
associations and individual members of
the American bar may accomplish in
their several localities.

